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Much has been written about the growing demand of the Turkish political elite for the presidential system, though
relatively little is known about the potential consequences of replacing the parliamentary democracy with an
executive presidency. While President Erdogan’s call for a constitutional change shows no sign of abating, several
cabinet members and senior Justice and Development Party (AKP) officials became vocal in their support for the
presidential system and its potential benefits in the long run, many of whom cited ‘system fragility’ and ‘inefficiency’
as the main reasons why the presidential system can outperform a parliamentary one in Turkey. The rationale for a
regime preference that the government officials put forward shows that we are far from understanding the
downsides of adopting the presidential system for Turkey in the long run.
Presidential systems have at least three deficiencies: System rigidity, majoritarian tendencies and dual legitimacy.
Contrary to the arguments put forward by Turkish government officials, there is a widely accepted observation that
presidential systems are inherently rigid, enforcing a fixed-term service no matter how unpopular the president is.
Similarly, presidential systems are known to be inefficient, particularly in the case of divided governments, often
leading to legislative gridlock. Hence, it comes as a big surprise that many AKP officials, along with the President,
publicly praised the presidential system for its efficiency and stability.
When it comes to majoritarian tendencies, the implications of the presidential system become more concerning for
Turkey. In the last decade, Turkish politics have increasingly become ideologically polarised, producing at least
three conflicting political camps: political and social conservatives, seculars and the Kurdish separatists. Ideological
polarisation went so far as to create a hostile political environment, one in which opposition parties have been
denied access to state resources and portrayed as an obstacle to the development of the country. Maximising
majoritarian tendencies of the political system by adopting presidentialism would do more harm than any other
political move under these conditions. Given the ‘winner takes all’ nature of presidentialism and increasing
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ideological polarisation, Turkey should not give up parliamentary and proportional representation (PR) electoral
systems.
Even proponents of presidentialism have accepted that the balance of presidential–congressional powers is key to
democratic survival in non-parliamentary democracies.[i] Strong legislature and political parties play a key role in
preventing the president from abusing power. The call for a system change by Erdogan and AKP seniors, due to the
so-called system inefficiency, point to an important fact that is in stark contrast to this: Erdogan actually wants
presidentialism with weak legislature and political parties. Indeed, in a recent interview,  Minister of Justice Bekir
Bozdag revealed that the AKP intends to propose a ‘Turkish-style presidential system’, where the president will be
equipped with strong legislative powers while having few effective constraints. Bozdag added that Turkey needed
this system in order to have a ‘stable and strong government’ and to ease the decision-making process in politics.
Gerald Easter views the preference for presidentialism as a strategic calculation of those actors “who calculate that
they have the most to gain by limiting the access of others to the state’s power resources”. In many presidential
democracies, the rules of the game were designed to enhance majoritarian tendencies in favour of one political
group or individual. Although this does not lead us to conclude that the parliamentary system is superior to
presidentialism, in the Turkish context it does remind us of the potential consequences of electing a president who is
best known for his majoritarian tendencies and his wish for a strong presidency.
If it were to be implemented, I would argue that a presidential system in Turkey would only survive under the two
circumstances: The presence of a strong legislature and the removal of barriers to political participation. Political
science scholarship showed that “there might be an affinity between very strong presidencies and authoritarianism”.
In the US, the often cited example for stable presidential regimes, has a strong legislature that prevents the
president from dominating the political agenda. On the other hand, in countries where the legislature has no or
limited power, such as Uzbekistan, the president’s ambitions and personality determine the fate of democracy.
Following the first condition being met, a stronger system of checks and balances can be established only if diverse
social and political groups get represented in politics. Turkey’s electoral threshold (10%) hampers the political
representation of different groups, granting only few political parties the chance of winning parliamentary seats by
setting barriers to political entry. As a consequence, smaller parties remain out of parliament whereas the leading
party obtains parliamentary seats disproportionate to its votes. Therefore, a shift to the presidential system would
create two political institutions, the presidency and legislature, that are controlled by the same political actor under
these circumstances.
Turkish government officials, following the lead of Erdogan, want a presidential system that concentrates power in
one’s hand. No matter how representative the parliament is, the President Erdogan who is notoriously known for his
authoritarian and polarising discourse in the last decade will have more say than the legislature. Then the
compelling question becomes whether Turkey really needs to adopt the presidential system, at least under these
circumstances?
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